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Abstract. This paper measures and decomposes the diﬀerences in earnings
distributions between public sector and private sector employees in Germany
for the years 1984 – 2001. Oaxaca decomposition results suggest that
conditional wages are higher in the public sector for women but lower for
men. Using the quantile regression decomposition technique proposed by
Machado and Mata (2004), we ﬁnd that the conditional distribution of wages
is more compressed in the public sector. At the low end of wages, diﬀerences
in characteristics explain less than the raw wage gap when it is the opposite at
high wages. Separate analyses by work experience and educational groups
reveal that the most experienced employees and those with basic schooling do
best in the public sector. All these results are stable over the 80s and 90s.
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1. Introduction
Public sector pay has always attracted policy attention. Obviously the size of
the public sector wage bill has implications for both monetary and ﬁscal
policy. The government remains by far the largest employer in Germany. In
2001, 13.1% of the labor force or 4.82 million people received their wage or
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salary from the public sector (Federal Statistical Oﬃce 2002). Furthermore,
the wage settlements in the public sector could have a substantial impact on
those in the private sector. Because of this spillover eﬀect, the existence of a
public sector wage gap may induce private sector employers to pay higher
wages to their employees. The concern is that such general wage increases can
jeopardize competitiveness in the global economy and further fuel inﬂation.
There are a number of reasons that earnings diﬀerentials between the
private and the public sector could exist. The public sector is subject to
political constraints and not to proﬁt constraints. In a perfectly competitive
market, employers that pursue other goals than competitiveness, such as
discriminating employers, will be driven out of the marketplace over the long
run (Becker 1957). On the contrary, the political system may have diﬀerent
objectives from those of the private sector. Issues of pay equity and fairness
can survive in the political market place more than in the economic market
place. Governments are also under pressure to be a model employer and not
pay low wages to its less skilled workforce. Similarly, voters seem to refuse
that high-level oﬃcials receive comparable remuneration to the high salaries
of the private sector. Nevertheless, the pursuit of theses equity goals could
have a serious impact on the eﬃciency of the labor market. If the government
pays too much, employees in the private sector may decide to queue for
relatively high-paying jobs in the public sector. Moreover, this policy leads to
higher taxes or budget deﬁcits. If the public sector pays wages that are too
low, it will not ﬁnd skilled and loyal employees. The consequences will be
public services of poor quality.
Given these diﬀerences in the wage setting procedures and the possible
consequences for the labor market, many researchers have sought to ascertain
whether an identical employee working in the same job in the public and in
the private sector would earn the same or a diﬀerent amount. Early research
comparing the earnings of public sector employees has been undertaken in the
United States by Smith (1976 and 1977). She found that rates of pay were
higher for public sector than private sector employees and that the earnings
premium was larger for female than for male public sector employees. Sub-
sequent research has taken up the same question as Smith and conﬁrmed her
ﬁndings. Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) and Gregory and Borland (1999)
have surveyed this voluminous literature. Such wage comparisons using
German data are not as numerous. Dustmann and Van Soest (1997) used
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1984–1993 to
analyze developments and diﬀerences in public and private sector wage dis-
tributions. They found that conditional on education, marital status and age
wages are higher in the private sector for males but higher in the public sector
for females. Dustmann and Van Soest (1998) estimated switching regression
models for males and models that endogenize education. Their later results
are stronger than the results that they reported in 1997.
Poterba and Rueben (1995) were the ﬁrst to apply quantile regression to
study public-private wage diﬀerentials. This is a natural arena for quantile
regression, since there is a suspicion that the public sector compresses the
distribution of earnings of employees who work in that sector relative to
private sector employees. Therefore, the least squares estimate of the mean
public sector wage premium gives an incomplete picture of the conditional
distribution. Evidence of this eﬀect is available for Canada (Mueller 1998),
UK (Disney and Gosling 1998) and Zambia (Nielsen and Rosholm 2001).
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Quantile regression has apparently not yet been applied to study the wage
structure in the private and public sectors in Germany. This is the object of
this paper.
Section 2 describes the data set along with some descriptive statistics.
In Sect. 3, the quantile regression decomposition technique proposed by
Machado and Mata (2004) is presented. The next section is dedicated to the
empirical results for the year 2001. Section 5 shows how the decomposition
results have evolved from 1984 to 2001. Finally Sect 6 gives some concluding
remarks.
2. Data description
The analysis in this paper draws on data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP)1. In this and the fourth section, we focus on the year 2001. In
Sect. 5 we analyze the evolution from 1984 to 2001. After the reuniﬁcation,
the panel was extended to include the eastern part of Germany, but we focus
here on West Germany only because undeniable economic diﬀerences subsist
between East and West Germany. Since many public sector jobs are not open
to foreign nationals, the analysis is based on the subsample of Germans only.
Furthermore, the sample is restricted to include those who were between 18
and 65 years old and were in full-time or part-time employment. Finally, all
observations with a missing value for one of the variables have been excluded.
The ﬁnal data set has 4770 observations.
As the sample includes only wage earners, the results must be interpreted
conditional on the selected sample. Issues of sample selection bias and the
potential problem of endogeneity of sector choice and education are con-
sidered outside the scope of the present paper, which concentrates on dis-
tributional aspects. This is, of course, a more descriptive approach and some
caution must be exercised in interpreting the results.
Table A.1 in Appendix describes the variables we use for our descriptive
analyses and in the decompositions. Table A.2 presents descriptive statistics
for male and female public and private sector employees. Means of relevant
variables show that average hourly earnings are higher in the public sector
than in the private sector. They also show that public sector employees are,
on average, better educated than private sector employees. For instance, 18%
of the employees in the public sector have achieved a university degree (Ed
level 6), while they are only 8% in the private sector. Public sector employees
have acquired more labor market experience and tenure, too. These diﬀer-
ences in work experience, education and tenure may explain the higher
average wages of public sector employees. Another cause of the disparity
between average compensation in the public and the private sectors may be
the greater concentration of professionals and technicians in the public sector.
A ﬁrst visual summary of the public and private sector wage distributions
is provided in Fig 1. The density functions were estimated using an
Epanechnikov kernel estimator. It can be seen from these ﬁgures that the
distributions are quite distinct between sectors. For both genders, the public
1 For an English language description of the GSOEP see SOEP Group (2001).
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sector earnings distribution is characterized by a higher density function
around the mode and a lower dispersion. For males, the public sector earn-
ings distribution lies ‘‘within’’ the private distribution. Public sector
employees at the 5th quantile of the public sector earnings distribution enjoy
an earnings advantage over private sector employees at the same point in the
private sector distribution of wages; but the reverse holds for employees at the
95th quantile of the public sector and private sector earnings distribution.
With ‘‘higher ﬂoors’’ and ‘‘lower ceilings’’, the public sector compresses the
unconditional wage distribution.
Methodology
OLS and most statistical techniques focus on mean eﬀects. They restrict the
eﬀect of the covariates to operate in the form of a simple ‘‘location shift’’.
However, the descriptive statistics in the preceding section show that the
impact of the public sector on the distribution of the wages is probably more
complex. The quantile regression model introduced by Koenker and Bassett
(1978) is more ﬂexible than OLS and allows to study the eﬀects of a covariate
on the whole conditional distribution of the dependent variable. There is a
Table 2. Unexplained public sector wage gap by levels of education and experience
Education Low Medium High University
Men 2.9 (8.7, 2.5) 5.4 (10.9, 1.2) 10.1 (17.1, 2.8) 13.9 (24.7, 2.3)
Women 11.8 (5.6, 17.9) 10.5 (4.2, 17.0) 6.8 (3.2, 17.2) 1.3 (21.2, 26.3)
Experience Expr  10 10 < Expr  20 20 < Expr  30 30 < Expr
Men 8.4 (22.1, 6.0) 0.6 (6.7, 5.6) 6.9 (12.8, 1.1) 11.1 (17.3, 4.7)
Women 5.4 (16.9, 6.5) 7.4 (1.3, 16.6) 9.3 (2.2, 18.1) 9.6 (1.2, 17.9)
Note: Oaxaca and Blinder decompositions. All numbers are in percent. A 95% percentile
bootstrap conﬁdence interval (1000 replications) is reported in brackets.
Fig. 1. Kernel density estimates of the wage distributions.
Note: Epanechnikov kernel density estimates; the bandwidths were chosen using Silverman’s rule
of thumb
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rapidly expanding empirical quantile regression literature as the special issue
of Empirical Economics on this subject edited by Fitzenberger et al. (2001)
witnesses. Applications of quantile regression on the structure of earnings in
West Germany can be found in Fitzenberger and Kurz (2003).
Let yi be the log wage of worker i and Xi a vector of covariates repre-
senting the individual characteristics. The statistical model used in this paper
speciﬁes the hth quantile of the conditional distribution of yi given Xi as a
linear function of the covariates,
Qh yijXið Þ ¼ Xibh; h 2 ð0; 1Þ: ð1Þ
As shown by Koenker and Bassett (1978 and 1982), the quantile regression
estimator of bh solves the following minimization problem
b^h ¼ argmin
b
X
i:yiXib
h yi  Xibj j þ
X
i:yi<Xib
1 hð Þ yi  Xibj j
" #
: ð2Þ
This problem can be shown to ﬁt into a GMM framework which has been
used to prove consistency and asymptotic normality of b^h and to ﬁnd its
asymptotic covariance matrix (Buchinsky 1991, 1998).
Following Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), the diﬀerence in average
earnings between workers in each sector can be decomposed into diﬀerences
in personal characteristics and diﬀerences in coeﬃcients (price diﬀerential or
unexplained diﬀerential). Since this approach considers only diﬀerences at the
means of the two earnings distributions, Mueller (1998) and Garcia et al.
(2001) suggested to combine the decomposition technique with quantile
regressions to determine the rent component at various points in the wage
distribution. The problem with this technique is that only one point in the
covariates distribution is considered: the mean. Diﬀerences in higher mo-
ments of the distribution of the independent variables are not controlled for.
Therefore we will not present results using this technique.
Machado and Mata (2004) propose a decomposition procedure which
combines a quantile regression and a bootstrap approach. First, in the
quantile regression model the conditional quantiles of y are given by (1) and
can be estimated by quantile regression. The second idea underlying their
technique is the probability integral transformation theorem from elementary
statistics: If U is uniformly distributed on 0; 1½ , then F1 Uð Þ has distribution
F. Thus, for a given Xi and a random h  U 0; 1½ , Xibh has the same distri-
bution as yi Xij . If, instead of keeping Xi ﬁxed, we draw a random X from the
population, Xbh has the same distribution as y. Formally, the estimation
procedure involves 4 steps:
1. Generate a random sample of size m from a U 0; 1½ : u1 . . . ; um.
2. Estimate for each sector m diﬀerent quantile regression coeﬃcients:
b^pubui ; b^
priv
ui ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m:
3. Generate for each sector a random sample of size m with replacement from
the covariates of X, denoted by

~Xpubi
m
i¼1 and

~Xprivi
m
i¼1.
4.

~ypubi ¼ ~Xpubi b^pubui
m
i¼1 and

~yprivi ¼ ~Xprivi b^privui
m
i¼1 are random sample of size
m from the marginal wage distributions of y consistent with the linear
model deﬁned by (1).
5. Generate a random sample of the counterfactual distribution.
~ycfi ¼ ~Xpubi b^privui
m
i¼1 is a random sample from the wage distribution that
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would have prevailed in the private sector if all covariates had been dis-
tributed as in the public sector.
Now we can decompose the change of any statistics from one sector to the
other into the contribution of the coeﬃcients and the contribution of the
covariates. Machado and Mata (2004) analyze the changes in the wage
density. In order to simplify the comparison with the Oaxaca decomposition,
we will decompose the quantiles of the wage distribution:
Qh ypub
 Qh ypriv
 ¼ Qh ~ypub
 Qh ~ycf
  þ Qh ~ycf
 Qh ~ypriv
  þ residual
ð3Þ
The ﬁrst term is the contribution of the coeﬃcients and the second term is the
contribution of the covariates to the diﬀerence between the hth quantile of the
public sector wage distribution and the hth quantile of the private sector wage
distribution. The residual term comprises the simulation errors which dis-
appears with more simulations, the sampling errors which disappears with
more observations and the speciﬁcation error induced by estimating linear
quantile regression. In this paper, we assume that the linear quantile regres-
sion model is correctly speciﬁed2. Thus, asymptotically, the residual vanishes
and Eq. (3) is a true decomposition of the diﬀerences in quantiles.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Decomposition of the public-private sector wage diﬀerential
In order to decompose the diﬀerences in the wage distribution into diﬀerences
in the coeﬃcients and diﬀerences in the workers attributes, we apply the
Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition and the Machado and Mata procedure
described in Sect. 3 with the number of replications, m, set to 10000. The
vector of regressors Xi includes experience (speciﬁed in a quartic form), job
tenure, marital status, part-time status, education and occupation. The
descriptive statistics of these variables are given in Table A.2. The reference
educational category is the lowest educational group and the reference
occupational category is Service Worker.
The results are summarized in Table 1. In addition to a point estimate, the
second line in each cell presents the 95% bootstrap conﬁdence interval for this
estimate. These are the quantiles 2.5% and 97.5% of the distribution of the
relevant statistic obtained by a design matrix bootstrap with 1000 replica-
tions. The price diﬀerential estimated by the Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition
(mean) equals –6.9% for men, indicating that wages in the public sector are
about 7% lower than wages in the private sector. For females, on the other
hand, the public sector employees earn an unexplained public sector wage
diﬀerential of 8.2%. Both results are strongly signiﬁcant and are similar to
those of Dustmann and Van Soest (1997).
2 Little is known in the case of misspeciﬁcation. Angrist, Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val
(2005) give ﬁrst results on this subject.
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The Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition does not consider the possibility that
the distribution of actual wages around their predicted values diﬀer across
sectors. In fact, both the unconditional and the conditional wage distribution
in the public sector are more compressed than those in the private sector.
Therefore, to complete the analysis, Table 1 presents also results from the
Machado/Mata decomposition with h ¼ 0:10; 0:25; 0:5; 0:75 and 0.90. The
estimated unexplained public sector wage gap varies strongly with h. For
males this price diﬀerential decreases from 5% at h ¼ 0:10 to –17.4% at
h ¼ 0:90. For females, this diﬀerential varies from 29.6% at h ¼ 0:10 to –
6.9% at h ¼ 0:90. The public sector compresses the pay dispersion and,
therefore, reduces the within-group pay inequality. On the contrary, the
characteristics diﬀerential seems to be stable over the wage distribution and
does not vary with h. Finally, the residual component is never signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
linear model is well-speciﬁed.
The quantile regression model can be used to characterize the entire
conditional distribution. Figure 2 present a concise visual summary of the
Machado and Mata decomposition results. 99 decompositions have been
estimated with h ¼ 0:01; . . . ; 0:99: The 95% conﬁdence interval is also plot-
ted. The monotone decrease of the public sector unexplained diﬀerential as
we go from the lowest to the highest quantiles appears clearly. The pattern is
the same for both genders.
A consequence of these results is that the gender wage gap is smaller in
public employment than in private employment. Interestingly, it contradicts
standard economic theory. Unlike the private sector, the public sector is not
Fig. 2. Machado and Mata decomposition of the public/private sector wage diﬀerential.
Note: Variables controlled for in the regressions are education, experience, occupation, marital
status, tenure and part-time status. The conﬁdence intervals have been estimated by a percentile
bootstrap with 1000 replications
512 B. Melly
subject to proﬁt constraints. Becker (1957), for instance, suggests that proﬁt-
maximizing behavior is incompatible with the existence of discrimination.
Following this argument, we might expect the adjusted male-female earnings
diﬀerential to be smaller in the private sector. Why should nevertheless the
male-female earnings diﬀerential be smaller for public sector than private
sector employees? First, the pay system for all public sector employees is
uniform and centralized. It is regulated in the Federal Act on the Remu-
neration of Civil Servants (Bundesbesoldungsgesetz), which requires equal
pay for all individuals with the same seniority and qualiﬁcations who are
employed in a given job. Equal opportunity and anti-discrimination policies
are therefore more eﬀectively implemented in public sector than private sector
labor markets. Second, we have found that the distribution of wages is more
compressed in the public than in the private sector. Blau and Kahn (1992)
have shown that the more compressed the pay distribution, the lower the level
of gender discrimination. Their evidence relies on cross-national comparisons
of the impact of diﬀerent wage distribution on the gender wage inequality.
Here, there are two diﬀerent pay systems within one land.
A consequence of this large wage advantage of females in the public sector
is the overrepresentation of women in the public sector. They represent 51%
of the public sector employees but only 42% of the private sector employees.
Whether this wage policy is eﬃcient or not depends on the interpretation of
the gender earnings diﬀerentials. If it is believed that wage discrimination
against females in private sector labor markets is causing ineﬃcient resource
allocation decisions, the presence of the positive public sector wage gap for
women will reduce the degree of wage discrimination and improve the eﬃ-
ciency of the labor market.
4.2. Decomposition of the public sector wage diﬀerential by educational
attainment
Since the wage diﬀerential may vary across education levels, the public sector
wage diﬀerential is now decomposed separately for four ranges of schooling:
Low education (corresponds to Ed level 1 and 2), Medium education (Ed level
3), High education (Ed level 4 and 5) and University (Ed level 6). The other
regressors and the number of replications are the same as above. Table 2 and
Figure 3 give the results of the Oaxaca and Blinder and of the Machado and
Mata decompositions separately for each category.
The left-hand panel of Fig. 3 provides the information for men. Quantile
regression estimates show the same pattern for the 4 educational categories:
the price diﬀerential declines as we move up the income distribution. Thus,
the story of Fig. 2 is conﬁrmed: the public sector reduces the within-group
inequality by compressing the wage distribution. The comparison of the price
diﬀerential for the four educational groups in Table 2 shows that it decreases
monotonically as the educational qualiﬁcation increases. The public sector
unexplained wage diﬀerential falls from –2.9% for the lowest education group
at –5.4% for the second group, -10.1% for the third and –13.9% for the top
education category. Since the average wage increases with the number of
years of schooling, there is an equalizing eﬀect between educational groups
attached to public sector status.
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The right-hand panel of Figure 3 illustrates the results for women. There
is again evidence of a negative gradient in price diﬀerential across the income
quantiles. As for men, there is evidence of an equalizing eﬀect between groups
attached to public sector status. While the level of the price diﬀerential is
about 15% higher for women than for men, the diﬀerences between the
educational levels are similar for both genders. The political pressure on the
government not to pay low wages to its less skilled employees could explain
why the return to education is higher in the private then in the public sector.
An implicit minimum wage in the public sector arises from this policy.
Similarly, the government has the tendency to underpay its most skilled
workforce. Very high salaries in the public sector seem to be not accepted by
voters.
4.3. Decomposition of the public sector wage diﬀerential by levels of experience
The decomposition of the public sector wage diﬀerential may also vary across
diﬀerent levels of experience. The observations are now segmented in four
experience groups: those with less than 11 years of experience, 11–20 years,
21—30 years and more than 30 years. The other regressors and the number of
replications are the same as above. Figure 4 combines the results by experi-
ence and quantile in the same way as Fig. 3 did. The bottom part of Table 2
gives the results of the Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition separately for each
category.
With a few exceptions, we observe again the equalizing eﬀect of the public
sector relative to the private sector, with a negative gradient in the unex-
plained public sector wage gap as we move up the income distribution. The
less experienced groups seem to make exceptions.
If we compare the level of the price diﬀerential for the four experience
groups for men in Table 2, it seems that the results do not vary with the
Fig. 3. Price diﬀerential by educational attainment.
Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regressions are
experience, occupation, marital status, tenure and part-time status
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experience of the workers. On the contrary, the level of the unexplained
public sector wage gap depends signiﬁcantly on experience for women. It is
–5.4% for the least experienced groups and increases monotonically to 9.6%
for the most experienced groups. This diﬀerence between both sectors could
be explained by the rigid hierarchical pay structure in the public sector.
Salaries increase more or less mechanically with seniority. Wage decreases are
diﬃcult if not impossible. Moreover, a part of the discrimination of women
takes the form of slower promotion rates. The centralized pay system in the
public sector could reduce this form of discrimination. On the other hand, it
may be easier to retain the same job after a maternity break or to change from
full-time employment to part-time employment in the public sector. There-
fore, females in the public sector could have more human capital than females
in the private sector with the same age and the same education level (Dust-
mann and Van Soest 1997). It should be noted, however, that the experience
pattern reﬂects a combination of age, experience and cohort eﬀect.
5. Evolution over time
Diﬀerences in the cyclical responsiveness of earnings of public sector and
private sector employees may induce short-run changes of the public sector
wage gap. Earnings of private sector employees generally vary pro-cyclically.
Thus, if the pay structure is less ﬂexible in the public sector and cannot react
after an economic boom or a crisis, the public sector wage gap will vary
counter-cyclically. Borjas (1984) presents another theory of why public/pri-
vate earnings diﬀerential may vary over time. In his model, electoral wage
cycles are generated as a result of optimizing behavior on the part of voters,
bureaucrats, and the government. His empirical analysis for USA indicates
that federal wage rates rise signiﬁcantly more in election years.
Fig. 4. Price diﬀerential by levels of experience.
Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regressions are
education, occupation, marital status, tenure and part-time status
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Therefore, it would be restrictive to study the issue of wage inequality
between the public and the private sector based on only one cross-section of
data and we expand now the analysis on the ﬁrst 18 years of the SOEP. The
same procedure as in Sect. 4 has been applied for each of the 18 years. A
concise visual summary is given in Fig. 5. Since the characteristics diﬀerential
is almost the same at all quantiles, only the estimate for h ¼ 0:5 is shown. The
estimates of the price diﬀerential are given for h ¼ 0:2; 0:5 and 0.8.
Remarkable in this ﬁgure is the stability of the estimates during almost 2
decades. It is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd a trend or a cyclical component in these
time series. All attempts to link the decomposition results with an economic
or a political cycle were also unsuccessful. The results for diﬀerent experience
or education categories (not plotted) are also stable although the variance of
the estimates is higher. This parallelism between public and private sector
wages probably reﬂect the structure of wage negotiation in Germany.
Collective bargaining agreements cover practically all areas of the public and
the private sector. Wages of public sector workers are not formally linked
with those in the private sector but indirectly they are since the negotiated
results of the large private sector unions are often taken as a benchmark for
the public sector.
6. Conclusions
The wage structure in the public and private sectors in West Germany has
been examined using the data from the GSOEP for the years 1984–2001.
Oaxaca decomposition results suggest that conditional wages are higher in the
public sector for women but lower for men. Using the quantile regression
decomposition technique proposed by Machado and Mata (2004), we ﬁnd
Fig. 5. Evolution from 1984 until 2001.
Note: Machado and Mata decomposition. Variables controlled for in the regressions are
education, experience, occupation, marital status, tenure and part-time status
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that the conditional distribution of wages is more compressed in the public
sector. At the low end of wages, diﬀerences in characteristics explain less than
the raw wage gap when it is the opposite at high wages. Allowing the
decomposition results to be diﬀerent for four categories of education, we ﬁnd
that the public sector reduces also the between-group inequality. Those with
basic schooling obtain the highest unexplained public sector wage gap. The
decomposition results by levels of experience suggest that the price diﬀerential
increases with the years of experience for women. Finally, we examine the
evolution of the results from 1984 to 2001 and ﬁnd no trend or cycle. The
wage structure seems to be extremely stable.
Are these diﬀerences in wages between the public and private sector ‘‘true’’
premiums, or are there other factors at work? There may be ‘‘compensating
diﬀerentials’’, such as working conditions and fringe beneﬁts. The diﬀerences
may also reﬂect unobserved individual characteristics. Therefore, the results
do not necessarily have a causal interpretation. Rather they provide a
descriptive comparison of earnings distribution for public and private sector
employees. An interesting extension of this work would naturally be to
combine the distributional analysis with a correction for the endogeneity of
the sector choice. Abadie et al. (2002) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005)
have proposed diﬀerent instrumental variable estimators for quantile
regression that could be used for this purpose. However, beyond the technical
diﬃculties it remains very diﬃcult to ﬁnd sensible exclusion restrictions to
identify the sector choice equation. This probably explains the lack of
robustness of estimators that control for the endogeneity of sector choice.
The Machado and Mata decomposition is a very interesting methodology
but has the inconvenience of requiring the estimation of a large number of
quantile regressions, which is computationally involved. Further research
should try to improve on it. A less computer-intensive procedure would be
necessary in order to reduce the computation time, particularly for big data
sets. Finally, a formal proof of the consistency of this estimator and its
asymptotic distribution should also be the object of further research.
Machado and Mata (2004) estimate the asymptotic distribution by a simple
bootstrap of the generated samples but give no proof that the bootstrap is
consistent.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Explanation of variables
Variable Description
Wage Gross hourly earnings from employment. Gross hourly wage are
derived by dividing gross monthly earnings by monthly actual hours worked.
Ln(wage) The natural logarithm of wage.
Expr Number of years of potential work experience the individual
has accumulated. It is measured by min(age-schooling-6, age –18).
Gender Dummy; 1 if women.
Tenure Number of years with current employer
Part-time Dummy; 1 if the individual is part-time or marginally employed.
Married Dummy; 1 if married.
Ed level Ordered variable on education:
Ed level 1 Dummy; 1 if no degree or basic or intermediate schooling with no training.
Ed level 2 Dummy; 1 if basic schooling with apprenticeship.
Ed level 3 Dummy; 1 if intermediate schooling with apprenticeship.
Ed level 4 Dummy; 1 if high school (Abitur or Fachabitur) with no training or
with apprenticeship.
Ed level 5 Dummy; 1 if high school with technical school or polytechnic.
Ed level 6 Dummy; 1 if university.
Management Dummy; 1 if occupation in management.
Professional Dummy; 1 if professional.
Technician Dummy; 1 if technician.
Clerk Dummy; 1 if clerk.
Service worker Dummy; 1 if service worker.
Agriculture Dummy; 1 if occupation in agriculture.
Craft Dummy; 1 if craft and related trades workers.
Plant Dummy; 1 if plant or machine operator or assembler.
Elementary Dummy; 1 if elementary occupation.
Psect Dummy; 1 if employed in the public sector.
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